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A measles outbreak has been occurring in a health-
care setting in Porto, Portugal, since early March 
2018, posing public health challenges for a central 
hospital and the community. Up to 22 April, 96 cases 
were confirmed, 67 in vaccinated healthcare workers, 
mostly between 18-39 years old. Following identifica-
tion of the first cases, control measures were rapidly 
implemented. Concomitantly, other measles cases 
were notified in the Northern Region of the country. No 
common epidemiological link was identified.
A tertiary level hospital in Porto with ca 4,400 health-
care workers (HCW) has been affected by a measles 
outbreak since March 2018, cases were mainly vacci-
nated HCW. As measles is a mandatory notifiable dis-
ease [1] in Portugal, the confirmation of the first cases 
on 14 March lead to the prompt implementation of pub-
lic health control measures. We present preliminary 
findings of this outbreak, highlighting public health 
initial actions and their short-term results.
Case definition
In this outbreak, we started using the European 
Commission (EC) case definition [2]. Clinical criteria 
included any person with fever and maculopapular 
rash and any of the following three - cough, coryza, 
conjunctivitis. Possible cases were those meeting clini-
cal criteria. Probable cases were those with clinical cri-
teria and an epidemiological link (any connection with 
the hospital since February 2018). Confirmed cases 
were individuals not recently vaccinated and meeting 
the clinical/ epidemiological and laboratory criteria 
outlined in the EC case definition.
From 16 March, the case definition changed after 
we noticed atypical clinical presentation of mea-
sles in several individuals. Clinical criteria included 
any person with maculopapular rash, or fever and 
any of the following three symptoms: cough, coryza, 
conjunctivitis.
 
Outbreak description
On 13 March, the clinical director of a hospital in 
Porto reported a probable measles outbreak to the 
Public Health Regional Department (DSP), with 24 
HCW affected. The local public health unit was then 
notified to assess and manage the situation, and ini-
tiated the epidemiological investigation. All cases 
had a connection to the adult Emergency Department 
(aED) and their clinical presentation included maculo-
papular rash, low fever, tachycardia and headache. The 
National Reference Laboratory, Instituto Nacional Dr. 
Ricardo Jorge, Lisbon, confirmed the first two cases on 
14 March.
From 11 February to 22 April, 211 cases linked to the 
hospital were notified, with 96 confirmed cases 
(Figure).
In the same period, 405 cases were notified at the 
national level, with 109 confirmed cases [3].
Epidemiological investigation led to the retrospective 
identification of the earliest, the possible imported 
primary case: a young adult from a European country 
with circulating measles virus that arrived in Portugal 
ten days before the rash onset. The clinical case defini-
tion was met and laboratory results (positive IgM) con-
firmed the case. Genotype B3 was identified.
The mean age for the 211 cases notified was 33.3 
(SD: 12.5), 135 cases were female. Preliminary find-
ings showed that all but one confirmed measles cases 
(n  =  96) occurred in adults (≥ 18 years; 18-39); 60 
(62.5%) were female. Confirmed cases included 86 
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HCW (Table). One hospitalised patient was affected. Of 
the 96 confirmed cases, 67 (69.8%) were vaccinated 
with two doses of measles vaccine or measles mumps 
and rubella (MMR) vaccine.
The last confirmed case had its rash onset on 9 April. 
No further cases have been identified linked to this 
hospital setting.
Control measures
With the aim to control the outbreak in the hospital, 
decrease the number of secondary cases and minimise 
transmission into the community setting, an Emergency 
response team (ERT) was constituted. The ERT included 
hospital staff (clinical director, emergency department 
director, nurse director, occupational health team, 
infection control and prevention team and infectious 
disease physicians) and the local public health unit 
(local health authorities, public health physicians and 
nurses).
The hospital’s contingency plan was activated, and an 
isolation area was created to evaluate possible and 
probable cases in the aED. Precautions were instituted 
to prevent airborne transmission in the hospital, espe-
cially in departments with several cases. These precau-
tions included the instalment of a portable laminar flow 
high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration system, 
the use of surgical masks, or P2/N95 respirators for 
HCW entering rooms with possible and probable cases. 
In addition, hand hygiene was strengthened.
All cases were advised to remain isolated for 4 days 
after they developed a rash. Medical clearance to 
return to work was given 5 days after the rash onset 
if there were no clinical complications from measles or 
if there were no continuing symptoms. Post-exposure 
prophylaxis (PEP) [4,5] (vaccine or immunoglobulin) 
was offered within 72 hours to susceptible HCW and 
patients that had contact with a measles case. The 
regional stockpile of MMR vaccine and immunoglobu-
lin allowed a rapid supply of these products. Two 
vaccination posts were created and HCW were advised 
to get vaccinated if they had not received two MMR 
doses in the past or a presumptive immunity due to 
disease; a total of 1,132 vaccines were administered.
For every possible or probable case in a HCW, the 
infection control and prevention team created a list of 
susceptible patients with whom the HCW may have had 
contact during their infectious period. Of more than 
500 contacts identified, 73 patients received the MMR 
vaccine and 68 were immunised with immunoglobu-
lin due to contraindications to vaccination or a high 
risk of severe illness and complications from being 
vaccinated.
As the outbreak occurred in a university hospital, med-
ical and nursing schools were contacted and advised 
to inform students about the outbreak. Students 
were advised to verify their immunisation status and 
instructed to immediately report any symptoms within 
the measles case definition. Daily situation reports 
were released to HCW employed at the university 
hospital.
At the community level, local public health teams (from 
cases’ place of residency) performed case and contact 
investigation. Control measures included verification 
of immune status and PEP as well as symptom sur-
veillance. If during case investigation the teams found 
any information relating to the hospital, they will send 
it to the ERT and they would manage it in the hospital 
setting.
At national level, DGS was responsible, among other 
aspects, to promote community engagement through 
short communications in media, three times a week 
reports and enforcing active epidemiological surveil-
lance by alerting healthcare services in public and pri-
vate health sectors.
Figure 
Confirmed cases of measles by day of symptom onset, Porto, Portugal, 11 February−22 April 2018 (n = 96)
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Table
Characteristics of measles cases by case classification, Porto, Portugal, 11 February−22 April 2018 (n = 211)
Confirmed cases Probable cases Total number of notified cases
n % n % n %
Total 96 45.5 82 38.9 211 100.0
Diagnostic site
CHP 85 88.5 80 97.6 196 92.9
Other 11 11.5 2 2.4 15 7.1
Sex
Female 60 62.5 52 63.4 135 64.0
Male 36 37.5 30 36.6 76 36.0
Age group (years)
0–17 1 1.0 3 3.7 5 2.4
18–29 50 52.1 20 24.4 79 37.4
30–39 39 40.6 32 39.0 85 40.3
40–49 5 5.2 11 13.4 22 10.4
50–59 1 1.0 7 8.5 10 4.7
60–69 0 0.0 3 3.7 4 1.9
70–79 0 0.0 5 6.1 5 2.4
80–89 0 0.0 1 1.2 1 0.5
Symptoms
Maculopapular rash 84 87.5 63 76.8 147 69.7
Fever and any of cough, coryza, conjunctivitis 35 36.5 33 40.2 68 32.2
Laboratory results
Confirmed in first analysis 80 83.3 0 0.0 80 37.9
Confirmed in second analysis a 16 16.7 0 0.0 16 7.6
Vaccination/immune status
No vaccination or measles history 5 5.2 12 14.6 21 10.0
One dose of measles vaccine 11 11.5 14 17.1 29 13.7
Two or more doses of measles vaccine 67 69.8 44 53.7 126 59.7
Presumptive immunity due to disease c 2 2.1 2 2.4 5 2.4
Unknown 11 11.5 10 12.2 30 14.2
Epidemiologic link
Without epidemiologic link b 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Non-HCW 9 9.4 23 28.0 38 18.0
HCW 86 89.6 59 72.0 173 82.0
Physicians 31 36.0 13 22.0 49 28.3
Nurses 20 23.3 27 45.8 60 34.7
Health technicians 6 7.0 3 5.1 11 6.4
Medical students 12 14.0 5 8.5 19 11.0
Nursing students 5 5.8 0 0.0 5 2.9
Support staff 12 14.0 11 18.6 29 16.8
CHP: Centro Hospitalar do Porto; HCW: healthcare workers;
a For cases where the first laboratory confirmation samples were negative or not conclusive, second samples were necessary to exclude any 
false negatives or to exclude IgM false positive results in unvaccinated individuals through evidence of posterior seroconversion at about 
10 days after the first laboratory analysis.
b Probably the primary case of the outbreak.
c Presumptive immunity due to disease: auto reported or documented previous measles infection.
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Discussion 
Several efforts have been made globally to eliminate 
measles [6-8], a highly contagious viral communicable 
disease that has the potential to infect 75–90% sus-
ceptible contacts [9] and is spread by airborne trans-
mission [10].
Portugal had its last measles outbreak in 2017 follow-
ing an imported case [11]. Prior to this, Portugal had 
12 years without endemic measles transmission [11]. 
In the current outbreak, transmission of measles has 
occurred mainly in the healthcare setting. Proactive 
control measures were readily instituted which helped 
to control the outbreak and avoid a higher number of 
secondary cases in other settings. Measures included 
notification, isolation of cases, list of susceptible 
cases, contact tracing, screening for new cases and 
immunisation of susceptible population.
Vaccination or acquired immunity after illness are con-
sidered reliable protections against the disease [9]. 
Portugal is a country with a high level of reported vacci-
nation coverage for MMR vaccine [12] and in 2017, MMR 
vaccine coverage at the age of 5 years was 96% [13]. 
According to the National Plan for Measles Elimination 
[14], HCW are highly recommended to receive two 
doses of MMR vaccine or documented evidence of 
measles infection, considering they are at a higher risk 
of exposure to the virus. Nevertheless, we are seeing 
outbreaks occurring that encompass healthcare set-
tings [9,15]. The frequency of cases among HCW directs 
attention to the need of considering interventions to 
ensure this group is well protected, including vaccina-
tion and infection control and prevention measures.
Strikingly, most cases were in young (18-39 years 
old) fully vaccinated HCW. This feature has also been 
documented in other outbreaks [9,15]. The high fre-
quency of cases among vaccinated people, likely due 
to waning vaccine-derived immunity [15] in a situation 
where natural boosting is taking place to a very limited 
extent, points towards the need to further investigate 
this issue to recommend new approaches. This is espe-
cially important for populations that are at a higher 
risk of being exposed to diseases, such as HCW, and 
spreading disease to individuals in a vulnerable situa-
tion, such as patients.
As we had our first case confirmation on 14 March and 
three cases started symptoms before March 2018, we 
had a delay between disease onset and confirmation 
of the diagnosis. This might have happened because 
Portugal has a low incidence of measles, therefore, 
HCW and clinicians do not commonly see measles in 
clinical practice and thus it may not have been their 
first diagnosis. In addition, atypical clinical presenta-
tion in vaccinated individuals could have been a con-
tributing factor [16].
The atypical clinical presentation of measles in vac-
cinated individuals can occur with mild or moderate 
symptoms [17] similarly to our outbreak (maculopapu-
lar rash as the only clinical criteria or low fever). To 
ensure that as many cases were identified as possible 
during the outbreak, the case definition was adapted, 
increasing sensitivity, taking atypical presentation of 
measles into account.
In a country with low incidence of measles, this out-
break emphasises risks and challenges posed locally, 
such as infection of fully vaccinated individuals and the 
sustainability of herd immunity in a healthcare setting.
Further investigation of this outbreak is ongoing, 
including genotyping of all cases.
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